

Modeling loan loss provisions under IFRS 9 in the top-down solvency stress test of the Central Bank of Hungary

- a discussion of the paper by
Péter Lang and Martin Stancsics


Discussant: Monika Marcinkowska



2019 EBA POLICY RESEARCH WORKSHOP

"The future of stress tests in the banking sector – approaches, governance and methodologies"

Paris, 27-28 November 2019



#1

Main findings

Main findings

- „The **change in expectations** due to an **adverse shock** has an **immediate and sizable impact** on loan loss provisions in contrast to the previous incurred loss approach. This might **exacerbate the procyclical behavior** of the banking sector”



Figure 1: Loan loss provisions along the baseline and stress scenario under IFRS 9








Figure 2: Loan loss provisions along the stress scenario under various provisioning rules



Confirmation of previous observations/studies

- „cliff effects”
- „front-loading”



e.g.
Z. Novotny-Farkas (2016), *The Interaction of the IFRS 9 Expected Loss Approach with Supervisory Rules and Implications for Financial Stability*

A.-G. Kund, D. Rugilo (2019), *Assessing the Implications of IFRS 9 on Financial Stability using Bank Stress Tests*

Confirmation of previous observations/studies


- Pro-cyclicality



Confirmation of previous observaions/studies

- Conclusion: IFRS 9 alleviates the disadvantages of IAS 39, but the problems with provisionning are still significant





#2

General overview of the paper

General overview

- Impairment forecasting under stressed conditions – very important issue
- Good presentation of the stress-test framework
 - forecasting loan loss provisions and risk-weighted assets of each bank for each period of the stress test's time horizon conditional on the macroeconomic scenario
 - A versatile dynamic balance sheet framework
- Data
 - Non-financial corporate portfolio of the Hungarian banking system
 - Good granularity (1,5 mn contracts, 12,5 mn observations)
 - Transition probabilities estimated on contract-level database (Central Credit Information System + financial statement data from the National Tax and Customs Administration)
 - „the obligor-level estimation would seem more logical as the loans of a company usually default at the same time” – not always true
 - Forecasts of macroeconomic variables based on the macroeconomic forecasting model of the Central Bank of Hungary

General overview

■ Stress scenario

- Risk premium (t-1) 300 bps
- Y-o-y difference of log real GDP (t-1) -5 pps
- Y-o-y difference of log end consumption (t-1) -3 pps
- Exchange rate depreciation since loan origination (per cent) (t-1) 15 pps


General overview

- Markov models
 - The same approach as in several other studies

e.g.

Jimmy Skoglund, Principal Product Manager, SAS and Wei Chen, Director of Stress Testing Solution, SAS Institute (2017), *Forecast of forecast: An analytical approach to stressed impairment forecasting*

Vaněk, Hampel (2017), *The probability of default under IFRS 9: multi-period estimation and macroeconomic forecasts*



#3

Limits of the research

Assumptions

■ Assumptions for new loans originations

- „banks disburse the same loans, at the same time of the year, to firms with the same characteristics as last year”
 - possible change of level in time?
 - possible change of structure over time?

■ Assumption of LGD level

- „For the LGDs, we employed our expert judgement, fixing the LGD at 40 percent for the baseline, and at 50 percent for the stress scenario”
 - different levels of LGD necessary



LGD

Chart 23. Dispersion of LGD – 2010.
(Median, interquartile range, 5th and 95th percentiles)





Chart 25. Dispersion of LGD under the adverse scenario – 2012
(Median, interquartile range, 5th and 95th percentiles)



EUROPEAN BANKING AUTHORITY
2011 EU-WIDE STRESS TEST
AGGREGATE REPORT



ANALYSES
ET SYNTHÈSES

Table 2 Risk parameters and RWA rates for the banks on large corporates						
	Mean	St-dev	Nb of Obs.	25th perc.	Median	75th perc.
LGD (%)						
Bank #1	44	9	2 852	40	45	48
Bank #2	34	3	1 069	34	34	34
Bank #3	39	3	381	39	39	39
Bank #4	34	5	908	36	36	36
Bank #5	38	4	2 798	35	35	35

Figure 9: Mean LGD (in %), without correction for resolution time bias




Figure 11: Mean LGD (in %), with correction for resolution time bias, by geography, EUR discount rate






Figure 12: Mean LGD (in %), with correction for resolution time bias, by industry, EUR discount rate



A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Alternative Discount
Rate Concepts for Computing LGDs using Historical Bank
Workout Data



#4

Some questions and suggestions

Further research



Stress test scenario

■ Suggestions for other macroeconomic variables:

- Unemployment rate
- Interest rates
- Loan rates
- Inflation
- Asset prices (esp. real estate)
- Coverage ratio
- Public debt
- Credit / GDP
- Credit growth
- Risk-weighted assets
- Capital market prices



Foglia (2009), *Stress Testing Credit Risk: A Survey of Authorities' Approaches*

Louzis, Vouldis, Metaxas (2012), *Macroeconomic and bank-specific determinants of non-performing loans in Greece: A comparative study of mortgage, business and consumer loan portfolios*

Abid, Ouertani, Zouari-Ghorbel (2014), *Macroeconomic and Bank-Specific Determinants of Household's Non-Performing Loans in Tunisia: a Dynamic Panel Data*

Procyclicality of provisions vs. capital buffers

- Does the countercyclical buffer mitigate the negative pro-cyclical consequences of IFRS 9 provisions?
- Which provisioning model works best with the CCyB?
- Necessary changes in credit risk models? (CRD/CRR vs. IFRS)

Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró, Saurina (2013), *Macroprudential Policy, Countercyclical Bank Capital Buffers and Credit Supply: Evidence from the Spanish Dynamic Provisioning Experiments*

Agénor, Zilberman (2015), *Loan Loss Provisioning Rules, Procyclicality, and Financial Volatility*

Agénor, da Silva (2017), *Cyclically adjusted provisions and financial stability*


Abad, Suarez (2017), *Assessing the cyclical implications of IFRS 9 – a recursive model*

ESRB (2017), *Financial stability implications of IFRS 9*

Prorokowski (2018), *IFRS 9 in credit risk modelling*


Tax treatment

- The tax treatment of provisions



Liquidity

- Provisioning rules – impact on capital and liquidity



Other issues

- Bank-specific characteristics
 - Different impact on different banks?
 - e.g. bank size, level of capitalisation...

Loan Loss Provisioning and the Business Cycle: Does Capital Matter?

Evidence from Philippine Banks

Danvee Floro¹

This version: 15 March 2010

Abstract

Using a comprehensive and unique database of Philippine financial intermediaries from 2001-2009, we examine how the bank capital position influences the management of loan-loss provisioning. The results show evidence of capital management through loan-loss provisioning. We also find a procyclical behavior of banks in loan loss provisioning but such a link is influenced in a non-linear way by bank capitalization: both low-capitalized and well-capitalized banks provision by less (more) during an economic expansion (downturn).



Other issues

- Could this tool be used
 - to assess (verify) adequacy of banking provisioning models?
 - to investigate potential earnings management?
 - to monitor the alignment of IRB capital adequacy and ECL accounting?



PD



8 August 2019

IFRS 9 Benchmarking Report 2019

Expected Credit Loss estimates of banks vary at least by a factor 4

EXHIBIT 5
VARIABILITY OF THE 12-MONTH ECL (IN BP) FOR A LARGE CORPORATE BORROWER (PD = 75BP, UNSECURED) IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES – COMMON SCENARIO






EXHIBIT 6
VARIABILITY OF THE LIFETIME ECL (IN BP) FOR A LARGE CORPORATE BORROWER (PD = 75BP, UNSECURED) IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES – COMMON SCENARIO






#5

Policy implications

Policy implications

- Change of accounting standards?
- Convergence of accounting principles and capital adequacy rules?
- Convergence of micro- and macroprudential tools?





monika.marcinkowska@uni.lodz.pl